巴菲特的投资哲学有没有变化? 进入21世纪后,巴菲特如何看待市场? 我想,有必要仔细研究他从1999年以来对BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY股东的通信.
以下是1999年给股东的信的摘录:
Our gain in net worth during 1999 was $358 million, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 0.5%. 本年净利润为3亿5千8百万美圆,每股净资产增加0.5%.
Please note that I spoke of hoping to beat the S&P "modestly." For Berkshire, truly large superiorities over that index are a thing of the past. They existed then because we could buy both businesses and stocks at far more attractive prices than we can now, and also because we then had a much smaller capital base, a situation that allowed us to consider a much wider range of investment opportunities than are available to us today. 巴菲特感叹伯克希尔投资组合超过标普指数已经是"过去"的事了,不能再像过去以很有吸引力的价格买到公司和股票,而且因为基数太大,也很难找到大小适合的投资机会了.
We made important progress in this respect during 1999 by acquiring Jordans Furniture and contracting to buy a major portion of MidAmerican Energy. We will talk more about these companies later in the report but let me emphasize one point here: We bought both for cash, issuing no Berkshire shares. Deals of that kind arent always possible, but that is the method of acquisition that Charlie and I vastly prefer. 本年伯克希尔用现金并购了JORDAN家具公司和中美能源公司.
谈到JORDAN家具公司,巴菲特写道:
Like our three previous furniture acquisitions, this business had long been in the family -- in this case since 1927, when Barry and Eliots grandfather began operations in a Boston suburb. Under the brothers management, Jordans has grown ever more dominant in its region, becoming the largest furniture retailer in New Hampshire as well as Massachusetts.
The Tatelmans dont just sell furniture or manage stores. They also present customers with a dazzling entertainment experience called "shoppertainment." A family visiting a store can have a terrific time, while concurrently viewing an extraordinary selection of merchandise. The business results are also extraordinary: Jordans has the highest sales per square foot of any major furniture operation in the country. 这是一家族经营的企业,1927年由巴里和艾略特的祖父在波士顿郊区开业,在兄弟俩经营下,已经成为麻省和新罕布希尔州最大的家具零售商.这家公司的经营手法是很特殊体验式销售,很成功,JORDAN是美国大家具商里每平方英尺销售额最高的公司.
巴菲特购买中美州能源公司,似乎显得很简单:
Now, for our second acquisition deal: It came to us through my good friend, Walter Scott, Jr., chairman of Level 3 Communications and a director of Berkshire. Walter has many other business connections as well, and one of them is with MidAmerican Energy, a utility company in which he has substantial holdings and on whose board he sits. At a conference in California that we both attended last September, Walter casually asked me whether Berkshire might be interested in making a large investment in MidAmerican, and from the start the idea of being in partnership with Walter struck me as a good one. Upon returning to Omaha, I read some of MidAmericans public reports and had two short meetings with Walter and David Sokol, MidAmericans talented and entrepreneurial CEO. I then said that, at an appropriate price, we would indeed like to make a deal. 巴菲特也许早有进入电力行业的打算,而且他信任他的老朋友的推荐.
Charlie and I try to behave with our managers just as we attempt to behave with Berkshires shareholders.我和查理像对待股东一样与我们的经理层相处.
巴菲特接着讲述了一个生动的故事,来说明与高层经理的融洽关系:
Its about R. C. Willey, Utahs dominant home furnishing business, which Berkshire purchased from Bill Child and his family in 1995. Bill and most of his managers are Mormons, and for this reason R. C. Willeys stores have never operated on Sunday. This is a difficult way to do business: Sunday is the favorite shopping day for many customers. Bill, nonetheless, stuck to his principles -- and while doing so built his business from $250,000 of annual sales in 1954, when he took over, to $342 million in 1999.
R.C.威利家装公司是伯克希尔1995年从比尔柴尔德手中购买的产业.比尔和员工都是摩门教徒,他们有周日不工作的习俗.尽管周日通常对于商家是个生意繁忙的日子,但比尔仍能取得很好的经营业绩.
Bill felt that R. C. Willey could operate successfully in markets outside of Utah and in 1997 suggested that we open a store in Boise. I was highly skeptical about taking a no-Sunday policy into a new territory where we would be up against entrenched rivals open seven days a week. Nevertheless, this was Bills business to run. So, despite my reservations, I told him to follow both his business judgment and his religious convictions. 比尔认为生意在尤他州以外也能做得很好,1997年他建议在BOISE开个新店. 尽管我认为在新地方开店如果仍采用周日不开业,将很难与一周七天工作的对手竞争,但这毕竟是"比尔的生意",而且比尔很坚持他的立场.
Bill then insisted on a truly extraordinary proposition: He would personally buy the land and build the store -- for about $9 million as it turned out -- and would sell it to us at his cost if it proved to be successful. On the other hand, if sales fell short of his expectations, we could exit the business without paying Bill a cent. This outcome, of course, would leave him with a huge investment in an empty building. I told him that I appreciated his offer but felt that if Berkshire was going to get the upside it should also take the downside. Bill said nothing doing: If there was to be failure because of his religious beliefs, he wanted to take the blow personally. 比尔提出一个特别的建议,个人出资购买土地并盖好商场,大概要花九百万美圆,如果新店经营成功了,他会以这个成本价格将店铺转为公司资产,如果失败了,不用付他一分钱,所有损失由他自己承担. 这对他将是一笔大投资,我对他说,公司不会挑肥拣瘦,我们愿意共同承担结果.但比尔坚持认为,如果是因为他的宗教信仰造成失败,他将个人承担这个打击.
The store opened last August and immediately became a huge success. Bill thereupon turned the property over to us -- including some extra land that had appreciated significantly -- and we wrote him a check for his cost. And get this: Bill refused to take a dime of interest on the capital he had tied up over the two years. 新店于去年八月开张了,马上获得了巨大成功.比尔按当初承诺将店铺以成本价转给公司.当然,这块地已经升值了很多,我们开了一张支票给他,比尔坚持只收成本价格,土地升值部分一文不取地退了回来.
If a manager has behaved similarly at some other public corporation, I havent heard about it. You can understand why the opportunity to partner with people like Bill Child causes me to tap dance to work every morning. 很难想象其他上市公司里有这样行事的经理人员,至少我没有听说过. 和比尔这样的经理共事是我们的幸运,这也是为什么我可以快乐轻松地过每一天的原因.
巴菲特引用的财务数据与GAAP有很大不同,可以清晰看到伯克希尔各实业的利润状况:
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| (1) Includes Executive Jet from August 7, 1998. | (3) Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses. |
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(2) Includes Jordans Furniture from November 13, 1999. |
(4) Includes General Re operations for ten days in 1998. |
看上去,鞋业公司的经营比较差,这是个疑问,为什么巴菲特要在这样一个毫无竞争力的行业里持有这样的公司.
Almost all of our manufacturing, retailing and service businesses had excellent results in 1999. The exception was Dexter Shoe, and there the shortfall did not occur because of managerial problems: In skills, energy and devotion to their work, the Dexter executives are every bit the equal of our other managers. But we manufacture shoes primarily in the U.S., and it has become extremely difficult for domestic producers to compete effectively. In 1999, approximately 93% of the 1.3 billion pairs of shoes purchased in this country came from abroad, where extremely low-cost labor is the rule.
Counting both Dexter and H. H. Brown, we are currently the leading domestic manufacturer of shoes, and we are likely to continue to be. We have loyal, highly-skilled workers in our U.S. plants, and we want to retain every job here that we can. Nevertheless, in order to remain viable, we are sourcing more of our output internationally. In doing that, we have incurred significant severance and relocation costs that are included in the earnings we show in the table. In the shoe business, where we have Harold Alfond, Peter Lunder, Frank Rooney and Jim Issler in charge, I believe we will see a similar improvement over the next few years.巴菲特了解,挑战来自于国外进口的低成本的鞋子.将考虑增加外购,但仍要维持鞋业公司美国工人的就业.他仍会给予鞋业公司的经理们一些时间去改善业绩.
巴菲特采用了一种特别的方式报告收益-LOOK-THROUGH利润.
To depict something closer to economic reality at Berkshire than reported earnings, though, we employ the concept of "look-through" earnings. As we calculate these, they consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) our share of the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. When tabulating "operating earnings" here, we exclude purchase-accounting adjustments as well as capital gains and other major non-recurring items. 计算公式是营业利润+主要投资项目的未分配营业利润的份额-假设这部分未分配营业利润支付给伯克希尔应交纳的税款. 计算营业利润时不包括进货调整\资本利得和其他非经常项目).
The following table sets forth our 1999 look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures can be no more than approximate, since they are based on a number of judgment calls. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 13, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
| Berkshires Approximate | Berkshires Share of Undistributed | |
| Berkshires Major Investees | Ownership at Yearend(1) | Operating Earnings (in millions)(2) |
| American Express Company ........... |
11.3%
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$228
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| The Coca-Cola Company ............... |
8.1%
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144
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| Freddie Mac .................................. |
8.6%
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127
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| The Gillette Company .................... |
9.0%
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53
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| M&T Bank ................................... |
6.5%
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17
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| The Washington Post Company ..... |
18.3%
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30
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| Wells Fargo & Company ............... |
3.6%
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108
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| Berkshires share of undistributed earnings of major investees |
707
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| Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings(3) |
(99)
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| Reported operating earnings of Berkshire |
1,318
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| Total look-through earnings of Berkshire |
$ 1,926
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(1) Does not include shares allocable to minority interests
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
(3) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays on the dividends it receives
从上表可以清楚看到截止1999年底,伯克希尔主要股票投资所占的股份比例.
Investments
Below we present our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $750 million at the end of 1999 are itemized.
| 12/31/99 | |||||
| Shares | Company | Cost* | Market | ||
| (dollars in millions) | |||||
| 50,536,900 | American Express Company ....... | $1,470 | $ 8,402 | ||
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company ........ | 1,299 | 11,650 | ||
| 59,559,300 | Freddie Mac ................ | 294 | 2,803 | ||
| 96,000,000 | The Gillette Company .......... | 600 | 3,954 | ||
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company ....... | 11 | 960 | ||
| 59,136,680 | Wells Fargo & Company ........ | 349 | 2,391 | ||
| Others ...................... | 4,180 | 6,848 | |||
| Total Common Stocks ............. | $8,203 | $37,008 | |||
| ===== | ====== | ||||
We made few portfolio changes in 1999. As I mentioned earlier, several of the companies in which we have large investments had disappointing business results last year. Nevertheless, we believe these companies have important competitive advantages that will endure over time. This attribute, which makes for good long-term investment results, is one Charlie and I occasionally believe we can identify. More often, however, we cant -- not at least with a high degree of conviction. This explains, by the way, why we dont own stocks of tech companies, even though we share the general view that our society will be transformed by their products and services. Our problem -- which we cant solve by studying up -- is that we have no insights into which participants in the tech field possess a truly durable competitive advantage. 本年的股票投资组合没有变化.巴菲特相信,在已投资的这些公司,都有持久的竞争优势,同时,他解释了为什么没有投资高技术企业的原因是,他还无法看出哪些高技术公司拥有持久竞争优势.