中国30多年的磨刀利剑
中国人何曾想到,35年前,世界银行给少数几个大学贷款,每个大学400万美元,就可以设立一个计算机实验室,送数十名学生公费留学。
那个时候,中国的大学老师,一个月80元,是英国同等级别大学老师工资的1%。如今,南京审计学院,中国一个非常不起眼的地方性专业学院,开出了引入高端人才(院士,千人计划,长江学者,杰青等)的住房补贴,每人最高可以得到350万人民币,而且是一次性免税给到个人的手里。这样的慷慨待遇,已经超过英国顶级大学和顶级教授的待遇。
尽管中国的人均GDP还是英国人均GDP的20%,但是,这个距离已经从原来的100倍,变成了5倍。2005年,中国GDP总量超过英国,2014年,中国GDP是英国的4倍。
在英国,要维修一段6英里长的高速公路,就要花3到4年时间。用同样的时间,中国把杭州湾大桥给造好了,该桥全长36公里。
京广高速,2118公里,2005年开建,2012年全线通车,历经7年时间,总投资4千亿人民币。2008年,中国第一条高铁,长度114公里的京津高铁,建成通车。2014年,中国高铁运行的总里程长达1.6万公里,形成全国“四纵”的格局。
在英国,政府也很想建高铁,可是,他们用20年时间论证,20年时间建设,而且,里程只有300英里。40年以后,中国早就是世界老大了,英国的第一条高铁才“即将”建成。
“亚投行”的出现
“亚投行”终于成立,中国答应初期规模为1000亿美元。成立50年的亚洲开发银行,其总资本也不到这个水平。世界银行成立70年,主宰世界经济秩序,2012年的贷款规模也就是300亿美元。
风水轮流转,经过37年的发展,中国从一个仰仗“世行”和“亚行”提供优惠贷款的一个贫困国家,变成一个让美国人都很“害怕”的世界第二大经济体。按货物贸易量、制造业增加值、外汇储备、220种主要工农业产品产量等指标来衡量,中国其实已经是世界的“第一大国”,把美国狠狠的甩到了后面。
中国近20年,武器装备和太空技术飞速发展,使美国、日本、俄国、欧洲等军事强国,都不敢藐视中国在国防方面的巨大力量。
“一年前,英国首相卡梅伦显得非常‘傻’,因为他对中国的示好,没有得到任何回报”,欧盟外交事务研究会主席、中国问题资深专家,弗兰克斯-歌德蒙特(Francois Godement)说,“可是,今年,卡梅伦首先提出加入亚投行,整个欧洲都把他当作‘天才’来看。不到数天,德国、法国、意大利,都跟在英国之后,纷纷宣布加入亚投行。”
歌德蒙特认为,中国人办事情一贯“不透明”,但是,欧洲经济大国(德、法、英、意)为什么都纷纷倒向“亚投行”,而不是自己建立“欧投行”呢?
他认为有三种原因。第一,欧盟成员国内部不团结,很难有统一的意见和行动。第二,在基础建设方面,欧洲已经远远不是中国的对手。最好的例子是“英法隧道”,该隧道建成的时间长,投资过高,投资者巨亏,消费者也不知道吃亏了多少。第三,英国等国家已经看到,中国的发展前景,不容欧洲人忽视,加入“亚投行”,使欧洲的跨国公司公司有机会吃亚洲基础设施建设的一块蛋糕。
在欧洲国家纷纷倒戈的时候,美国、日本为什么不舒服?
首先,美国主导世界银行70年。1万多名高薪人员,大部分在美国工作、生活。世界银行1945年成立的时候,主要是帮助欧洲、日本和美国的战后基础设施建设。上世纪80代年以后,世行的工作转向发展中国家。它与WTO(世贸组织)和IFM(国际货币基金)是世界三大金融和贸易机构,代表的是以美国为主的西方国家经济、政治、外交利益。中国是1980年加入世界银行的,刚开始是为了得到实惠的贷款,后来就成为世行的第三大“股东”,但是,中国几乎没有什么发言权。
亚行是1976成立的,总部设在菲律宾首都马尼拉,它90%以上的活动是“贷款”,硬贷款的利息6%到6.5%,软贷款几乎没有利息,贷款期限15年到40年不等。中国的多个高速公路和铁路融资项目都有“亚行”的支持,贷款总额接近150亿美元。中国1986年加入亚行,成为该行的第三大股东。亚行最大的两个股东是美国和日本,各持股16%,中国持股6%,又是“小三”。
中国在世行是“小三“,在亚行也是”小三“。可是,自从2010年超过日本成为世界第二大经济体以后,到2014年,其经济体量已经是日本的两倍多。随着中国的不断发展,她已经不愿意充当配角,而是想扮演主要的角色。所以,”亚投行“、”丝路基金“、”金砖国家银行“,争取让人民币纳入”特别持款权(SDR)”,都相应出现了。这是中国发出一连串冲击世界现有政治经济地缘的强烈信号。
因此,美国、日本的不舒服,不仅是亚投行的成功,更重要的是中国今后对他们在世界政治经济地位的长期撼动威力。
中国的全球地位已经不可逆转
世界经济危机,中国受到了打击,但是,比起其他国家,中国的经济增长却保持了非常强劲的趋势。中国靠的是13.7亿勤劳的人民,以及有决心和信心的政府。
如果考虑到许多发展中国家转型变为发达国家的历史,亚洲的“四小龙”(新加坡、香港、韩国、台湾)做到了。拉丁美洲的巴西,墨西哥等国家,数十年来无法迈过这个砍。
所谓金砖国家,除了中国还保持高的速度增长,巴西、俄国、南非的经济增长速度,由于受世界经济危机的影响,已经显得有气无力了。印度的经济增长可以与中国媲美,但是,印度与中国还不是一个等量级的,它要发展到中国今天的水平,最少要15年,而这15年期间,印度还会出现怎样的曲折,尚未可知。
也就是说,中国大陆,是继亚洲“四小龙”以后,最有可能冲刺发达国家的经济体。然而,中国与“四小龙”有巨大的区别,“四小龙”的人口是中国大陆的十六分之一,中国大陆每增长一个百分点,对世界经济的影响力,就是“四小龙”增长一个百分点的十六倍。这就难怪,在中国大陆的人均GDP还是台湾的三分之一的时候,她对世界的撼动力,已经是无可估量的了。
亚投行将打破现有的全球金融格局
亚投行的成立,首先打破了世界银行统治世界,亚洲开发银行影响亚洲,分别长达70年和50年的传统格局。美国人急了,因为,世界银行的相对地位从此走向下坡路。美国在亚行的股份与日本一样,其实是美国人借助日本人的手统治亚行,而亚投行的成立,对亚行的冲击是最直接的。这种形势下,美国和日本,能不焦急吗?
德、法、英、意与美国和日本不同,他们在世行和亚行,本来就没有什么决策权。欧洲国家之所以一直跟着美国和日本的利益走而对抗中国,是因为他们从来就没有认为中国会发展到今天这个地步。就连中国人,特别是那些还没有看到中国自身力量强大的中国人,也一直不看好中国的今天和明天。
不过,欧洲的政治家们是不傻的,在对抗中国没有用以后,就必须重新认识中国,好好的考虑传统的西方价值观,是不是曾经对中国有过片面和错误的判断。
中国哪一点不好了?经济增长连续37年高速而不间断,人均GDP增长30倍。2014年的GDP增长速度尽管只有7.4%,是20年来最低的,但是,其增长量等于半个印度或半个俄罗斯一年的GDP。同年的贸易顺差高达4千亿美元,等于世界一个中等偏上国家一年的总产值。
中国经历亚洲经济危机、世界经济危机,不仅没有倒下,而且,每次世界范围的经济危机,都使中国变得更加强大。中国在21世纪的重新崛起,对美国垄断地位的直接挑战,跟美国100年前的崛起对大英帝国统治地位的挑战一样。谁能够肯定美国的统治地位就永远不会被中国挑战呢?
前苏联倒下了,世界上还没有第二个社会主义国家能够像中国这样务实,把国家计划与市场的灵活机制结合得如此巧妙,不仅超越了计划经济模式,也超越了纯市场经济的力量。这种政府与市场都起作用的“第三种”经济发展模式,这就是中国的模式。李克强在2015年的政府工作报告中,继续强调“双引擎”,也就是强调政府和市场的双重力量。
在中国迅速发展的时候,西方国家,甚者包括一些国内的人,都在想,中国什么时候发展到了尽头,不仅出现危机,而且,整个国家崩溃?
中国新的发展战略,使全世界看到她的巨大潜力
但是,中国人民、中国政府,却在各种国内外的矛盾和挑战中,找到“冲出重围”的妙法。习近平从反腐斗争开始,整治官场。从法治建设开始,希望用法治代替人治,为中国今后的发展,谋求一个健康发展的轨道。从全面深化改革开始,为中国经济社会的发展爬坡、转型、技术革新与创造,营造一个体制机制环境。发展目标定位为“两个一百年”。全面小康是短期目标,到建国一百年的时候,中国就是一个发达国家,那个时候,中国的GDP总量可能是美国的两倍。
实现“两个百年”目标,是有可能的。亚投行、”一带一路”,等战略手段和措施,得到全世界的关注,并不是中国现在有什么太了不起的事情,而是,大家看好中国的未来发展和信心。因此,亚投行的出现,是中国开始撼动世界现有地缘政治经济的里程碑。
附件:What Europe needs is an EIIB, not an AIIB
Commentary
Fran?ois Godement
20th March, 2015
If Europe’s actions are watched from heaven, they must indeed bring some puzzlement. Here is a continent that is engaged in a prolonged drive to balance its public budgets, and is therefore starved for major investments – such as the infrastructure (transport, energy, telecommunication, alternative energy) needed to achieve better European integration and security. Here is a continent where the deficit-ridden member states have undertaken sales of public assets –although Greece is the glaring example, it is far from being the only one – including to Middle East and Asian sovereign investors. Here is a continent that is advocating (and to some extent, creating for itself) financial and fiscal transparency, with all the risks of seeing capital flows diverted to less demanding host countries.
Yet it is the same continent where a stampede suddenly starts to participate in the financing of Asia’s continued growth, by joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank sponsored by China. This despite the fact that Asia has piled up excess currency reserves ever since 1998 (and China is not alone in doing this), and enjoys a growth rate that puts European economies to shame. And Europe’s move is largely on China’s terms for international loans. Although there is no reason to blame China for doing today what others did a few decades ago, the fact is that Chinese financing and aid is both opaque in its terms and very clear in its intent. It is generally tied to markets for Chinese firms – much as Japanese or Korean aid and finance used to be tied to their own firms.
Only 20 years ago, when Europe responded to an initiative by Singapore to create ASEM (the Asia-Europe Meeting) it included as one of its pillars a forum for financing infrastructure projects in Asia – on Europe’s terms. The initiative petered out after a few years, at a time when Asia was short of cash after the 1998 Asian financial crisis.
Fast forward to today. The issue of project bonds for the European Union, and of a European infrastructure fund, now renamed the Juncker fund, has taken years to overcome internal opposition. The Juncker fund remains at a minimal size compared to the European economy. Meanwhile, European member states taking their cue from David Cameron – for once a European pioneer! – rush to bring the promise of financing to Asia. And this, not on the demanding rules that prevail inside the European Union (and that probably hinder investment), but on unknown future rules of an organization whose principal partner is China. For better or worse, China has done for itself, and for the countries that are friendly enough to merit its largesse, exactly what Europeans cannot or will not do for themselves: long-term financing of major public projects whose return is questionable and even hazardous. Indeed, ground-breaking projects have often been financial sinkholes: think of Panama, or even Eurotunnel, whose construction was achieved with a nearly total loss for the initial investors, if not for the millions of travellers who now use it. Because China’s economic structure produces giant and poorly managed surpluses, it excels at this sort of risky and open-ended gambits.
David Cameron has re-enacted with China and Asia an old English proverb: “bringing coal to Newcastle”(e.g. to what used to be England’s largest coal producing region). This makes perfect sense for the United Kingdom as opposed to Europe: first, the UK has no money to speak of for its own infrastructure investment – David Cameron is not talking here about money he does not have, but about the potential political benefit of courting China by breaking ranks with others and being the first to do so. Second, the City – and associated offshore locations – are largely deterritorialised, so that they may very well harbour investors from elsewhere who are willing to put money into Asian infrastructure on Chinese terms: in fact, Chinese investors (including from Hong Kong) might be among them. It perfectly befits the City’s role as an intermediary, collecting traffic fees without too much checking of the license plates. And it is very clear that David Cameron has no interest in strengthening Eurozone financing or European bargaining power in public markets. His sudden advocacy in early 2014 of an unconditional free trade agreement with China, while the European Union is trying to get China to sit down and negotiate smaller but more concrete commitments, was very telling. There is probably not a European interest that he would not sell against a potential windfall for the United Kingdom.
Last year, David Cameron looked isolated, and a little foolish –as the Chinese brought no gift in
return for his gesture. This year, he is about to look like a genius. For the biggest Eurozone partners –France,
Germany, Italy - have raced to follow suit within 72 hours. They certainly will not win any brownie points with the
Chinese, who may instead feel that the London financial market deserves a nod if it helps them build their regional
sphere of influence against Western – or Japanese – interests.
The move by Eurozone countries probably stems from traditional business considerations, as
opposed to Cameron’s political and financial gambit. If the AIIB takes off, their firms should be on to some of
the deals that will be made. It does not hurt to be among the founders. Let’s simply hope, in today’s climate
where abundant monetary liquidity returns to Europe, that they don’t bring too much capital. It has already
happened once –between 1993 and 1997 –that hapless European bankers, at a time of low growth and profitability
in Europe, joined another Asian gold rush by becoming major lenders, and were among the first losers when the
Asian financial crisis broke.
Today, stringent antigrowth rules for public budgets in Europe mean that many useful
infrastructure projects (starting with new British rail lines!) cannot be financed. Europe’
s lack of ambition, and the impact this has on the job opportunities of its young people, is creating a political backlash
across the continent. Just try explaining to European voters that the money our governments and banks will not put
up for European projects is about to go to Asia to support Chinese projects and companies. You will indeed create
more contempt for Europe.
A much more worthy undertaking would have been to expand the Juncker fund into a European
Infrastructure Investment Bank –in other words, an EIIB with external participants and funders.
This would include China, which has a structural current account surplus, and might consider European norms if
they come along with low geopolitical risk and predictable rates of return. But Europeans seem totally unable to agree
among themselves, and only able to compete against one another and to divide themselves in front of external parties.
The lack of ambition for Europe, and the unseemly race that says it all about the lack of trust among key member
states when it comes to economic interest, are indeed a sorry sight.