时间：周二下午14:00-17:00（自2013年9月11日始）
地点：Y402（第2周，9月11日）；南综合楼9楼经济发展研究院资料室（第3-16周）
主持：习明明博士(江西财经大学经济发展研究院)
本次活动由江西财经大学经济发展研究院资助，感谢吴志军院长的大力支持。
TOPIC:
Acemoglu, D. and James A. Robinson. Economic Originsof Dictatorship and Democracy.
Contents:
part one. questions and answers
1. Paths of Political Development 1
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5. The Agenda 14
2. Our Argument 15
1. Democracy versus Nondemocracy 16
2. Building Blocks of Our Approach 19
3. Toward Our Basic Story 22
4. Our Theory of Democratization 23
5. Democratic Consolidation 30
6. Determinants of Democracy 31
7. Political Identities and the Nature ofConflict 42
8. Democracy in a Picture 43
9. Overview of the Book 46
3. What Do We Know about Democracy? 48
1. Measuring Democracy 48
2. Patterns of Democracy 51
3. Democracy, Inequality, and Redistribution 58
4. Crises and Democracy 65
5. Social Unrest and Democratization 65
6. The Literature 75
7. Our Contribution 80
part two. modeling politics
4. Democratic Politics 89
1. Introduction 89
2. Aggregating Individual Preferences 91
3. Single-Peaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem 92
4. Our Workhorse Models 99
5. Democracy and Political Equality 113
6. Conclusion 117
5. Nondemocratic Politics 118
1. Introduction 118
2. Power and Constraints in Nondemocratic Politics 120
3. Modeling Preferences and Constraints in Nondemocracies 128
4. Commitment Problems 133
5. A Simple Game of Promises 144
6. A Dynamic Model 151
7. Incentive-Compatible Promises 161
8. Conclusion 171
part three. the creation and consolidation of democracy
6. Democratization 173
1. Introduction 173
2. The Role of Political Institutions 173
3. Preferences over Political Institutions 176
4. Political Power and Institutions 177
5. A Static Model of Democratization 181
6. Democratization or Repression? 186
7. A Dynamic Model of Democratization 193
8. Subgame Perfect Equilibria 201
9. Alternative Political Identities 203
10. Targeted Transfers 207
11. Power of the Elites in Democracy 207
12. Ideological Preferences over Regimes 211
13. Democratization in a Picture 214
14. Equilibrium Revolutions 215
15. Conclusion 218
7. Coups and Consolidation 221
1. Introduction 221
2. Incentives for Coups 224
3. A Static Model of Coups 225
4. A Dynamic Model of the Creation and Consolidation of Democracy 231
5. Alternative Political Identities 245
6. Targeted Transfers 246
7. Power in Democracy and Coups 247
8. Consolidation in a Picture 249
9. Defensive Coups 250
10. Conclusion 252
part four. putting the models to work
8. The Role of the Middle Class 253
1. Introduction 253
2. The Three-Class Model 259
3. Emergence of Partial Democracy 262
4. From Partial to Full Democracy 267
5. Repression: The Middle Class as a Buffer 274
6. Repression: Softliners versus Hardliners 278
7. The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy 283
8. Conclusion 285
9. Economic Structure and Democracy 287
1. Introduction 287
2. Economic Structure and Income Distribution 290
3. Political Conflict 292
4. Capital, Land, and the Transition to Democracy 293
5. Costs of Coup on Capital and Land 296
6. Capital, Land, and the Burden of Democracy 300
7. Conflict between Landowners and Industrialists 307
8. Industrialists, Landowners, and Democracy in Practice 312
9. Economic Institutions 313
10. Human Capital 316
11. Conjectures about Political Development 317
12. Conclusion 319
10. Globalization and Democracy 321
1. Introduction 321
2. A Model of an Open Economy 325
3. Political Conflict – Democratic Consolidation 331
4. Political Conflict – Transition to Democracy 334
5. Financial Integration 338
6. Increased Political Integration 344
7. Alternative Assumptions about the Nature ofInternational Trade 345
8. Conclusion 348
part five. conclusions and the future of democracy
11. Conclusions and the Future of Democracy 349
1. Paths of Political Development Revisited 349
2. Extensions and Areas for Future Research 355
3. The Future of Democracy 358
part six. appendix
12. Appendix to Chapter 4: The Distribution of Power in Democracy 361
1. Introduction 361
2. Probabilistic Voting Models 361
3. Lobbying 367
4. Partisan Politics and Political Capture 373
Bibliography 381
Index 401